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Abstract 
 
Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of 
bank globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have 
acquired substantial market power, and international activities have not 
necessarily made banks less risky. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the 
actual link between bank internationalization, bank risk, and market power. 
Analyzing this link is the purpose of this paper. We jointly estimate the 
determinants of risk and market power of banks, and we analyze the effects of 
changes in terms of the number of foreign countries (the extensive margin) and 
the volume of foreign assets (the intensive margin). Our paper has four main 
findings. First, there is a strong negative feedback effect between risk and market 
power. Second, banks with higher shares of foreign assets, in particular those held 
through foreign branches, have higher market power at home. Third, holding 
assets in a large number of foreign countries tends to increase bank risk. Fourth, 
the impact of internationalization differs across banks from different banking 
groups and of different size. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of bank 
globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have acquired substantial 
market power, and international activities of banks have not necessarily reduced bank risk. 
Given these perceptions, surprisingly little is known about the actual link between bank 
internationalization, bank risk, and market power. Analyzing this link is the purpose of this 
paper. We use a novel and very detailed bank-level sample on external positions of German 
banks provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. The data provide cross-border positions of all 
domestic parent banks as well as reports submitted by branches and subsidiaries located 
abroad. Based on these data, we develop a number of indicators measuring the international 
activities of German banks operating abroad.  
The data allow painting a nuanced picture of banks’ internationalization strategies. We can 
distinguish the number of countries in which banks are active (the extensive margin) from the 
volume of foreign assets (the intensive margin), and we compute these measures for different 
modes of entry into foreign markets (cross-border asset holdings, foreign branches, foreign 
subsidiaries). From the Bundesbank’s bank-level databases, we also obtain information on 
banks’ probabilities of distress, and we estimate a Lerner index as a bank-specific measure of 
market power. We use these data to analyze whether the internationalization of banks affects 
their probability of distress and their domestic market power.  
Understanding the risk-market power trade-off for internationally active banks is of key 
importance for policymakers. The recent financial crisis has unveiled that diversification 
benefits derived from international integration have to be weighed against larger exposure of 
international banks to risks. Yet, designing appropriate policy responses requires better 
insights into the link between bank risk and international activities of banks. Our results 
inform this debate since they provide evidence on the impact of internationalization on the 
performance of banks.  
Our analysis has four main findings: 
First, there is a negative correlation between market power and the probability to experience a 
distress event for German banks. This finding is in line with theoretical models suggesting 
that higher market power increases profits and allows banks to build up buffers against loan 
losses. 
Second, banks with higher shares of cross-border assets either held directly by their domestic 
headquarters or by foreign branches have higher market power at home. We also find that 
large banks in Germany do not necessarily enjoy higher market power. Instead, after 
controlling for other bank-specific characteristics, market power and size are negatively 
correlated. 
 Third, banks that maintain a foreign presence in a large number of foreign countries are more 
likely to reveal above-average probabilities of distress. One explanation for this finding is that 
maintaining a large international banking network is costly. 
Fourth, banks which differ in terms of size and banks from different banking group benefit 
differently from internationalization. Commercial and savings banks tend to improve their 
risk-return trade-off; cooperative banks tend to worsen their risk-return trade-off. Also, bank 
size has an impact.  
More research is certainly required to check the robustness of our results using data from 
other countries and time periods. Perhaps the most important shortcoming of our data is that 
they do not include full information on off-balance sheet activities. Hence, an important 
channel of international activities is not included. Overall though, our results suggest that the 
benefits ensuing from internationalization in terms of increasing margins and reduced risk are 
rather small. Even for those banks that can achieve higher levels of market power through 
internationalization, the marginal effects of going abroad are relatively small compared to the 
domestic determinants of market power. At the same time, and perhaps contrary to 
conventional wisdom, internationalization has a rather limited impact on bank distress. 
Instead, the most important determinants of bank risk are their very market power and 
profitability as well as their hidden reserves. 
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Die jüngsten Ereignisse auf den internationalen Finanzmärkten haben bei Vielen die Vorteile 
der Globalisierung des Bankensystems in Frage gestellt. Die großen, international tätigen 
Banken haben zum Teil eine erhebliche Marktmacht, und internationale Aktivitäten haben 
Banken nicht notwendigerweise weniger risikoreich gemacht. Gegeben diese Wahrnehmung 
gibt es überraschend wenig empirische Evidenz für den Zusammenhang von Risiko und 
Marktmacht bei Banken einerseits und den Grad der internationalen Tätigkeit von Banken 
andererseits. Diesem Zusammenhang widmet sich dieses Papier. Wir nutzen einen Datensatz 
auf Basis des Auslandsstatus der deutschen Banken, der von der Deutschen Bundesbank 
bereitgestellt wird.  
Diese Daten ermöglichen es uns, ein sehr differenziertes Bild der internationalen Tätigkeit 
deutscher Banken zu zeichnen. Wir können nicht nur untersuchen, ob Banken im Ausland 
tätig sind, sondern auch wie groß das Volumen ihrer Tätigkeit im Ausland ist und über 
welchen Kanal sie im Ausland operieren. Die Daten der Bundesbank liefern uns zusätzlich 
Informationen über das Auftreten von Schieflagen bei einzelnen Banken (distress), und wir 
können ein bankspezifisches Maß für die Marktmacht jeder einzelnen Bank, den sogenannten 
Lerner-Index, berechnen. Wir nutzen diese Daten zur Untersuchung der Frage, ob es einen 
Zusammenhang zwischen dem Auftreten einer Schieflage, der Marktmacht im Inland und 
dem Grad der Internationalisierung gibt.  
Ein besseres Verständnis des Trade offs zwischen Risiko und Marktmacht der Banken vor 
dem Hintergrund der Globalisierung ist aus verschiedenen Gründen wichtig für die aktuelle 
Politikdebatte zur Regulierung der Banken. Die Finanzkrise, die im Jahr 2007 begann, hat 
nicht nur die Vorteile der Globalisierung im Sinne einer besseren Diversifizierung von 
Risiken gezeigt. Sie hat auch verdeutlicht, dass Banken gerade durch ihr Auslandsgeschäft 
Risiken ausgesetzt sein können. Eine angemessene wirtschaftspolitische Antwort auf die 
Krise erfordert jedoch Informationen über den tatsächlichen Zusammenhang zwischen 
Risiken, Marktmacht und Globalisierung der Banken wie sie unsere Untersuchung liefert.  
Unsere Untersuchung hat vier zentrale Ergebnisse: 
Erstens finden wir für deutsche Banken einen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen der 
Marktmacht einer Banken und der Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine Bank in eine Schieflage 
gerät. Eine Erklärung hierfür ist, dass Banken mit größeren Gewinnmargen Risiken besser 
abfedern können. 
Zweitens haben Banken, die Aktiva im Ausland halten – sei es über die inländische 
Mutterbank, sei es über Zweigstellen im Ausland – eine größere Marktmacht im Inland. 
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen auch, dass dies kein reiner Größeneffekt ist. Große Banken haben  
 vielmehr eine geringere Marktmacht als ansonsten vergleichbare kleinere Banken, wenn man 
andere Einflussfaktoren auf die Marktmacht berücksichtigt.  
Drittens geraten Banken mit Niederlassungen in einer Vielzahl von Ländern im Ausland 
häufiger in Schieflagen als Banken, die nicht oder nur in wenigen Ländern aktiv sind. Dieser 
Effekt könnte sich durch die Kosten der Aufrechterhaltung eines großen internationalen 
Netzwerks erklären. 
Viertens unterscheiden sich die Effekte des Auslandsengagements in gewisser Weise je nach 
Typ und Größe einer Bank. Beispielsweise erhöht ein Auslandsengagement bei den 
Privatbanken und den Sparkassen tendenziell die Marktmacht und senkt das Risiko einer 
Schieflage, während dies bei den Genossenschaftlichen Banken nicht in dem Maße gilt.   
Es bedarf sicherlich weiterer Forschungsarbeiten, um die Robustheit unserer Ergebnisse für 
andere Länder und Untersuchungszeiträume zu testen. Eine Schwäche unserer Analyse ist 
sicherlich, dass in unseren Daten keine detaillierten Informationen über außerbilanzielle 
Geschäfte enthalten sind. Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse jedoch, dass die positiven Effekte 
der Globalisierung der Banken im Sinne von Marktmacht und Risiko in ökonomischer 
Hinsicht eher gering sind. Dies gilt selbst für die großen Banken, die global und an vielen 
Standorten tätig sind. Gleichzeitig und vielleicht entgegen oftmals geäußerter Meinungen hat 
die Globalisierung nur einen geringen Einfluss auf das Risiko einer Schieflage. Wichtigste 
Determinanten des Risikos von Banken sind vielmehr deren Profitabilität und der Umfang 
ihrer stillen Reserven. 
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Do banks benefit from internationalization?  
Revisiting the market power-risk nexus* 
 
1 Motivation 
Recent developments on international financial markets have called the benefits of bank 
globalization into question. Large, internationally active banks have acquired substantial 
market power, and international activities of banks have not necessarily made banks less risky 
(Giannetti 2007).1 Given these perceptions, surprisingly little is known about the actual link 
between bank internationalization, bank risk, and market power. Analyzing this link is the 
purpose of this paper. We use a novel and very detailed bank-level dataset provided by the 
Deutsche Bundesbank including balance sheets and income statements of all German banks, 
of their foreign branches and subsidiaries.  
The data allow painting a nuanced picture of banks’ internationalization strategies. Since 
information on banks’ foreign assets is not subject to reporting thresholds,2 we can distinguish 
the number of countries in which banks are active (the extensive margin) from the volume of 
foreign assets relative to total assets (the intensive margin), and we compute these measures 
for different modes of entry into foreign markets (cross-border asset holdings, foreign 
branches, foreign subsidiaries). From the Bundesbank’s bank-level databases, we also obtain 
information on banks’ probabilities of distress (Kick and Koetter 2007), and we estimate the 
Lerner index as a bank-specific measure of market power following Koetter and Poghosyan 
(2009). We use these data to analyze whether the internationalization of banks affects their 
probability of distress and their domestic market power.  
                                                 
*   Corresponding author: Claudia Buch, University of Tübingen, Mohlstrasse 36, 72074 Tuebingen, Germany, 
Phone: +49 7071 2972962. E-mail: claudia.buch@uni-tuebingen.de. 
This paper has partly been written during visits of the authors to the research centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The hospitality of the Bundesbank as well as access to its bank-level financial accounts and External Position 
Report databases are gratefully acknowledged. Financial support from the National Science Foundation in the 
Netherlands (NWO) (M. Koetter), the Foundation “Stiftung Geld und Währung” (C. Koch) and the EFIGE 
project financed by the European Commission (SSH-2007-1.2.1) is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to 
Klaus Düllmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Heinz Herrmann, Thomas Kick, Cordula Munzert, Esteban Prieto, Winfried 
Rudek, and participants of seminars at the ECB (December 2009) and the Deutsche Bundesbank (February 2010) 
for most helpful discussions and suggestions on an earlier draft. All errors and inconsistencies are solely in our 
own responsibility. 
1 Also, De Jonghe (2010) shows that universal, diversified banks are less stable then specialized peers. For an 
excellent survey on the role of market power in banking and risk-taking, see Beck (2008). 
2  In a companion paper, we study the bank-level and country-level determinants of German banks’ foreign 
activities (Buch, Koch, Koetter 2009). Foreign assets do not include off-balance sheet items with the exception 
of so-called irrevocable credit commitments. 
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Methodologically, we use a system estimator, which takes the simultaneous determination of 
risk and market power at the bank level into account. We address the potential endogeneity of 
foreign assets by adapting the methodology proposed by Frankel and Romer (1999). They 
suggest using the geographic component of international trade as an instrument for actual 
trade. We adapt their methodology to a panel context because, for the individual bank, we can 
use foreign GDP as an exogenous variable.  
In studying bank internationalization and banks’ risk-market power trade-off simultaneously, 
we link two strands of previous literature which, so far, stand mainly in isolation.  
First, literature on the internationalization of banks typically focuses on the determinants of 
the cross-border expansions of banks (Berger et al. 2003, Buch and Lipponer 2007, de Haas 
and van Lelyveldt 2010, Focarelli and Pozzolo 2005). This literature finds that regulatory and 
cultural barriers limit the international expansion of banks, and that more profitable and larger 
banks find it easier to overcome these barriers (Calzolari and Loranth 2010).  
Second, while there is a large set of studies looking at the determinants of risks in banking 
(De Nicolò 2001, González 2005, Nier and Baumann 2003), only a few papers address the 
impact of the internationalization of banks. Amihud et al. (2002), for instance, examine risk 
effects of cross-border bank mergers. Analyzing changes in market risk and stock price 
reactions, they find that, on average, cross-border bank mergers do not change the risk of 
acquiring banks. Méon and Weill (2005) study the impact of cross-border mergers in Europe 
on banks’ exposure to macroeconomic risks. They find that loan portfolios provide a sub-
optimal risk-return trade-off, and that there are potential gains in risk diversification from 
cross-border mergers. Our study takes a broader perspective since we analyze all modes of 
entry into foreign markets, not just entry through mergers and acquisitions. In terms of the 
effects of internationalization on risk, we find that being active in a large number of countries 
increases rather than decreases bank risk. This result is driven by the cooperative banks in our 
sample, and it suggests that the costs of monitoring a large portfolio outweigh the benefits in 
terms of diversification. 
There is also an abundant literature on the risk-market power nexus for banks. In a recent 
survey, Beck (2008) concludes that cross-country studies point mostly to a positive 
relationship between competition and stability in the banking system.3 We are not aware of 
previous literature analyzing the impact of bank internationalization on the link between risk 
and market power of banks.4 We find a negative relationship between banks’ market power 
and risk. In this sense, our results are in line with the theoretical model developed by Allen 
                                                 
3 Beck (2008) also points out that using concentration as a proxy for competition gives mixed results. In this 
paper, we use a bank-level measure for banks’ market power as a proxy for the intensity of competition that a 
particular bank is facing. 
4  For German banks, Behr et al. (2007) analyze the impact of diversification on banks’ risk-return-
characteristics, but they do not take the international dimension into account. 
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and Gale (2004) and Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008) who argue that less intense 
competition increases margins and thus buffers against loan losses.  
Understanding the risk-market power trade-off for internationally active banks is of key 
importance for policymakers. Under the impression of the global financial crisis that has 
started in 2007, the benefits of international banking in terms of a more efficient allocation of 
risks on international markets seem fairly illusive. The crisis has unveiled that international 
integration not only brings about diversification benefits but also exposes banks to risks. 
Some recently proposed policy measures and regulatory initiatives could even limit the 
international activities of banks (BIS 2009, IMF 2009). Yet, designing appropriate policy 
responses requires better insights into the link between bank risk and international activities 
of banks. Our results inform this debate. They reveal that internationalization has a relatively 
weak impact on bank risk. 
In addition, the crisis has spawned a discussion about the systemic implications of risks at 
large banks and on the need to impose stricter regulations on large, systemically important 
banks (see, e.g., Tarashev et al. 2009). This debate has largely ignored the possible link 
between market power and bank internationalization. As for non-financial firms, 
internationalization may generate an endogenous increase in bank productivity and market 
power. Indeed, our previous results (Buch et al. 2009) show that there is an endogenous self-
selection of more productive and large banks into foreign markets. This paper adds to this 
discussion by showing the impact of bank globalization on the domestic market power in 
banking. We in fact find that banks with a higher volume of foreign assets, in particular those 
held by foreign branches, enjoy greater market power at home. It is important to note in this 
context that large banks in Germany not necessarily enjoy also greater market power. Instead, 
after controlling for other bank-specific characteristics, market power and size are negatively 
correlated. 
In the following second Part, we derive theoretical hypotheses on the impact of 
internationalization on the risk-market power nexus for banks. In Part three, we present the 
data and descriptive statistics. In Part four, we describe the empirical model, and in Part five 
we present the regression results. Part six summarizes the evidence.  
2 Theoretical Hypotheses and Previous Findings 
In this paper, we empirically analyze the link between different measures of bank 
internationalization and two key outcome variables for banks. As regards bank 
internationalization, we distinguish foreign expansions of banks along the intensive margin 
(the volume of foreign assets relative to total assets) from the extensive margin (the number 
of countries in which banks are present). We also compute these measures for different modes 
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of market entry, i.e. cross-border lending, foreign subsidiaries, and foreign branches. The 
corresponding outcome variables are risk and market power of the banks’ overall business. 
Risk is measured as the banks’ probability of distress; market power is measured by the 
banks’ Lerner index (see Section 3).  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no single theoretical model available which would 
provide us with hypotheses on the link between these variables. Below, we summarize 
implications of the previous literature, which allow deriving hypotheses on the various 
outcomes of our model. 
H1: The expected impact of internationalization on the degree of market power at home is 
positive. 
Empirically, we will measure banks’ domestic market power by the Lerner index, which is 
defined as the mark-up between the banks’ average revenues and its marginal costs (see 
Section 3.4). We expect a positive long-run impact of internationalization on banks’ market 
power at home. In the short-run, and in particular during the early expansion period, the cost 
effects of internationalization might dominate, and measured market power might even 
decline. In the long-run, banks can be expected to maintain foreign operations only if they 
ultimately perceive a positive impact on their market position.  
The different channels of internationalization entail different fixed and variable costs, which 
could be reflected in our measure of bank market power. Cross-border asset holdings denote 
the channel of internationalization which entails low fixed costs but the highest variable costs 
since information on foreign markets is harder to obtain without having foreign affiliates. 
Entry through branches and through subsidiaries involves comparatively high fixed costs, but 
variable costs are lower instead. Fixed costs, in turn, tend to be higher for subsidiaries than for 
branches, because subsidiaries are legally independent, hold their own equity, and are subject 
to host-country supervisory control. Hence, subsidiaries demand the highest costs in terms of 
capital requirements and particular focus on regulatory burden.  
H2: A greater degree of diversification of foreign assets lowers bank risk. The impact of a 
higher volume of assets per se is ambiguous. 
If banks behave as portfolio managers, they optimize their expected utility as a positive 
function of expected profits and a negative function of expected portfolio risk (Rochet 2008). 
In an international context, foreign entry should have the potential to reduce banks’ (and thus 
regulators’) risk of insolvency (see, e.g., Berger 2000). This conventional wisdom is based on 
the notion that it is better for a bank not to put all its “eggs in one basket” (Winton 1999), 
hence geographic diversification might be a risk-reducing strategy. According to this 
interpretation, the impact of internationalization on bank risk depends on the correlation 
between domestic and foreign returns and on the volatility of foreign markets. Risk might 
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decrease if assets are sufficiently diversified, but risk might increase if diversification is 
limited and/or if foreign markets are risky.  
The extensive margin, which we measure through the number of countries in which banks are 
active, can be interpreted as one measure of portfolio diversification. Accordingly, the 
expected impact on risk is negative. We expect different results for subsidiaries and branches, 
as branches are more geared towards retail lending while subsidiaries act as portfolio 
managers. In contrast, the share of foreign activities in total assets per se (the intensive 
margin) would have no clear-cut impact on bank risk.  
However, offsetting the perceived benefits of international diversification are at least two 
potential costs that may well enhance bank risk. The first risk-increasing effect comes from 
the incentives banks have to shift risk when the regulatory safety net and its associated 
implicit and explicit guarantees are underpriced (John et al. 1991, John et al. 2000). A second 
reason why cross-border activities may increase risk concerns “who is watching the eggs in 
the basket” (Winton 1999). By extending its operations into new overseas markets, a bank is 
confronted with potentially new and risk-increasing monitoring problems related to the loan 
customer base or the operating cost structure of a large international portfolio. If monitoring 
and information costs are high, bank risk might increase.   
H3: The link between market power and bank risk is ambiguous.  
In our empirical model, we will also analyze how market power and risk influence each other. 
Allen and Gale (2004) suggest a negative relation between bank risk and market power 
because more concentrated banking systems reduce incentives of bankers to lend recklessly. 
Moreover, more concentrated systems can be supervised more effectively by regulators. In 
contrast, Boyd and de Nicolo (2005) argue that increasing market power of banks increases 
risk taking, because banks can roll-over higher risk associated with lower quality loans by 
charging higher interest rates from customers. If borrowers endogenously choose the risk of 
their project, an increase in lending rates then increases risk due to an adverse selection effect. 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008) show that this risk shifting effect is due to the assumption 
that loan default rates are perfectly correlated. They introduce imperfect correlation of loan 
default rates and show that there is an additional margin effect: More competition lowers loan 
rates as well as revenues from non-defaulting loans and thus reduces buffers against loan 
losses. This results in banks becoming riskier.5 The net effect is ambiguous. 
                                                 
5 In Caminal and Matutes (2002) the link between risk and competition is ambiguous as well; it depends on the 
banks’ trade-off between monitoring and credit rationing. 
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
We use several bank-level datasets of German banks, which have kindly been provided by 
the Deutsche Bundesbank to test the above hypotheses. The data are confidential and can be 
used on the premises of the Bundesbank, only. The main novelty of this paper is that we draw 
on a detailed database on banks’ international assets. The so-called “External Position 
Report” provides comprehensive information on the international assets of German banks, 
their foreign branches, and their foreign subsidiaries year-by-year, and country-by-country6. 
We use this database for the years 2003-2006 since reporting thresholds on international 
positions have been abolished in 2002. Hence, we do not face problems due to truncation or 
censoring. In addition, the supervisory data on distress events, which we use to estimate bank 
risk, is not available after 2006. 
We complement the “External Position Report” with information from the balance sheets and 
income statements of all banks operating in Germany between 2002 and 2006. Each bank 
which holds a German banking license is required to submit these data to the supervisory 
authority. Details on the data specification and definitions are given in the Appendix. 
3.1  Measuring Bank Internationalization 
The “External Position Report” contains information on cross-border assets held by the 
bank’s domestic headquarters, on foreign assets held by a bank’s foreign branches, and 
foreign subsidiaries. Establishing branches and subsidiaries is a much more cost-intensive 
channel of entering foreign markets, and only relatively few German banks use this mode of 
entry. On average, only 28 out of a total of 2,235 banks are purely domestic, 27 maintain 
only foreign branches, and 37 run subsidiaries and/or branches. The largest group consists of 
banks that hold international assets in at least one foreign country (2,143).7  
Using this information, we compute two broad measures of internationalization at the bank 
level, which in turn are differentiated by the mode of foreign market entry. 
Our first measure of bank internationalization is the volume of foreign activities relative to 
total assets, i.e. the intensive margin. We link branches and subsidiaries located in host 
country h to their domestic parent bank i. We aggregate all assets held in destination country 
j across the different modes of foreign activity and use a composite foreign asset. We do not 
distinguish between different types of assets to keep the analysis tractable.8 Apart from the 
                                                 
6 The “External Position Report”, however, does not cover off-balance sheet activities. 
7  See Buch, Koch, and Kötter (2009) for details. 
8 Note that the data do not allow netting out positions which a parent bank makes available to its foreign affiliate 
and which, in turn, its foreign affiliate holds as a cross-border position against a third country. 
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aggregate measure of cross-border assets, we also consider the share of cross-border assets 
held by the domestic headquarters, foreign branches, and foreign subsidiaries separately.  
Our second measure of bank internationalization describes the extensive margin. We 
compute the number of countries in which a bank holds cross-border assets as well as the 
number of countries in which this bank runs foreign branches and/or subsidiaries. If a bank 
holds several branches or subsidiaries in a particular country, we aggregate this information 
to obtain one observation per bank, country, and mode of market entry (branches or 
subsidiaries). In case of cross-border assets, our measure of the extensive margin is the 
number of countries in which a particular bank holds assets.  
3.2 Measuring Bank Risk 
Bank risk can be measured in several ways. Previous literature has used a bank’s z-score, 
non-performing loans, or the volatility of bank-level variables such as reserves, profits, or 
non-performing loans (Beck 2008, Behr et al. 2007, Corvoisier and Gropp 2002, De Guevara 
and Maudos 2007b). Yet, these measures do not provide information on actual failures of 
banks. Our measure of bank risk is a direct measure of the probability to experience a distress 
event. Distress events are defined by regulatory interventions, and information on these 
events is obtained from the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank. This database 
comprises distress events that range from weak incidences to forced exit by means of 
restructuring mergers ordered by the Federal Financial Supervision Authority (Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin). See Kick and Koetter (2007) and the Data 
Appendix for a description and analysis.  
Overall, the majority of banks (about 95%) has not reported any distress event during the 
observation period. In total, there have been 26 weaker distress events such as mandatory 
announcements by individual banks to the supervisory authority or official warnings by the 
BaFin and 240 more severe events such as direct interventions into the ongoing business of a 
bank by the BaFin or events that reflect the disappearance of a bank from active business 
operations such as closure of a bank or restructuring mergers. In our baseline specifications, 
we use a dummy variable that indicates the occurrence of any such event as the dependent 
variable; to check which events drive our results, we also distinguish between severe and 
weak events as defined above.  
The distress indicator has the advantage that it captures the occurrence of an actual distress 
event and thus of actual bank risk. Yet, larger banks have not experienced such an event 
under the period of observation. Hence, it measures risk for smaller banks only. To obtain a 
measure of risk for all banks, we follow Hale and Santos (2008) and Demirgüc-Kunt et al. 
(2008) and additionally compute a z-score given by ( )
σ
ρ+−
=
AEz  where AE  is a bank’s 
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capital-asset-ratio, ρ  is the mean of a bank’s profits, and σ  denotes the standard deviation 
of profitability. We calculate the z-score using a rolling 5-year window. Hence, the z-score 
measure increases if the standard deviation of profits increases, and it falls in the degree of 
capitalization and mean returns. The z-score measures the number of standard deviation of 
profits (below the mean) by which profits would have to fall until equity capital has been 
eroded (Hale and Santos 2008).  
3.3 Measuring Market Power  
We use the Lerner index to measure the domestic market power of individual banks. Lerner 
indices give the mark-up between average revenues and marginal cost, scaled by average 
revenues. They provide two clear advantages over other measures of market power. First, the 
Lerner index nests different models of competition and, second, it yields a measure at the 
level of the individual bank (Degryse et al. 2009). A higher Lerner index indicates a lower 
degree of competition (a higher degree of market power).  
We obtain both arguments used to compute the Lerner index from stochastic cost and profit 
frontier analysis and thus have competition measures net off operational slack (Koetter et al. 
2008). Marginal costs are the total derivative of estimated operating cost frontiers with respect 
to four outputs (interbank loans, customer loans, securities, and off-balance sheet items). By 
analogy to possible slack on the cost side, we obtain average revenues from profits predicted 
by a stochastic profit frontier, scaled by total assets so as to avoid confounding profit 
inefficiencies and realized (monopoly power) revenues. To account for the three-tier banking 
structure in Germany, we estimate both frontiers as latent classes, previously shown in 
Koetter and Poghosyan (2009).9 The underlying reason is that banks operate under different 
technology regimes.  
Summary statistics for the bank-level variables are provided in Table 2. Lerner indices are on 
average 23 points, which is in line with results reported by De Guevara and Maudos (2007a) 
for a sample of European banks and Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) for German banks. Since 
both, Lerner indices and distress events, are (partly) derived from annual accounting data, all 
covariates are specified with a lag of one year to avoid simultaneity by construction. 
Finally, average revenues and marginal costs comprise revenues and costs of domestic 
operations (including cross-border asset holdings) and of operating foreign branches but not 
of operating foreign subsidiaries. 
                                                 
9 See Koetter and Poghosyan (2009) for a more detailed discussion and for robustness tests. 
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4 Empirical Model and Regression Results  
4.1 Simultaneous Equation Model  
We need an empirical model which allows estimating the link between bank risk (probability 
of distress) and market power (Lerner index) jointly, and which allows analyzing the impact 
of internationalization on the risk-market power nexus.  
Simultaneous equation models based on two continuous variables have previously been 
applied in the banking literature (Kwan and Eisenbeis 1997).10  However, one of the variables 
that we are interested in (the probability of distress) is binary, and requires a system estimator 
which allows for binary variables. We thus employ an instrumental-variables estimation using 
the procedure suggested by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and described in Wooldridge (2002) for 
systems with one of the endogenous variables being binary.11   
Let the market power of banks be proxied by the Lerner index. Hence, the market-power 
equation has *,1,1 itit yy =  as a fully observed, continuous variable on the left-hand side. The risk 
equation uses the probability of distress as the dependent variable. As this probability is not 
observable, we proxy it by the binary indicator of an observable distress event, such that 
)0( *,2,2 >= itit yIy . In the structural-form setup, the dependent variables influence each other, 
i.e. risk influences market power and market power impacts on risk.  
To estimate the system, the following reduced-form equations are needed: 
ititit vy ,111,1 ' +Π= −X         (1a) 
ititit vy ,212,2 ' +Π= −X         (1b), 
where i is a bank-index and t denotes time. The market-power equation (1a) is estimated using 
OLS and yields the (K x 1)-vector of parameter coefficients 1'Πˆ . The risk equation (1b) is 
estimated using a probit model to obtain the (K x 1)-vector of parameter coefficients 2'Πˆ . 
Both equations draw on the same vector of independent variables 1−itX  which contain lagged 
values to account for simultaneity. From equation (1a), we compute residuals from the 
difference between the true market-power variable (the Lerner index) and fitted values 
11,1,1,1,1 'ˆˆˆ −Π−=−= ititititit yyyv X .  
                                                 
10  Previous literature has typically not formulated this problem in a system context. De Guevara and Maudos 
(2007b), for instance, use a single regression setting and regress the Lerner index on the probability of distress. 
Alternatively, Jiménez et al (2007) reverse the causality and regress risk proxies on competition measures. 
11 Maddala (1983) suggests estimating reduced-form equations for each endogenous variable. According to this 
method, the binary (continuous) dependent variable is estimated using a probit (OLS) model. In case of the 
continuous dependent variable, predicted values from the probit reduced-form estimation are then used as right-
hand side regressors. 
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Next, we estimate our main structural equations of interest: 
itititit yy ,11,11
*
,21,1 'ˆ εβγ ++= −X         (2a) 
ititititit vyy ,2,11,22,12
*
,2´ ˆ' εθβγ +++= −X       (2b), 
where 1.1 −itX  and 1,2 −itX  are the exogenous explanatory variables affecting risk and market 
power, respectively. Both include measures of internationalization. Fixed effects (time-fixed 
effects, regional and banking-group dummies) are included to control for the state of the 
macroeconomy.12 Equation (2a) is estimated using OLS, and equation (2b) is estimated using 
a probit model. We address the fact that equations (2a) and (2b) include generated regressor 
by bootstrapping the standard errors.  
The simultaneity between banks’ choices of market power and risk is captured in the 
following way. In the market-power equation (2a), we insert fitted values from the probit 
estimation of the risk equation (1a). In the risk equation, we insert the residuals from the 
continuous reduced-form equation ( itv ,1ˆ ) along with the true continuous variable, i.e. the 
Lerner index ity ,1 .
13 Rivers and Vuong (1988) recommend this procedure as the probit 
estimation relies on non-linear estimation techniques. A side-benefit of this setup lies in the 
implicit test for exogeneity of the Lerner index in the risk equation (Winkelmann and Boes 
2009). A z-test of the 0:0 =θH  indicates whether the true Lerner index ity ,1  is exogenous to 
the probability of distress.14 Results reported in Tables 3-5 below show that risk and market 
power are not independent. Instead, the Lerner residuals are usually significant in the risk 
equation, and we can reject the null of exogeneity between Lerner and our binary risk 
indicator. 
Our results suggest that the joint estimation of both equations is a reasonable specification. 
Generally, the cross-terms are negative and significant. Hence, our results are in line with 
theoretical models by Allen and Gale (2004) or the margin effect stressed in Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo (2008). Moreover, Table 4 shows that this finding – as some of the remaining 
results – is driven by the cooperatives as the largest banking group in the sample. 
4.2 Regression Results 
We organize our regression results as follows. Table 3a provides results of OLS regressions 
using the Lerner index as the dependent variable; Table 3b provides results of probit 
                                                 
12 The main qualitative results remain unchanged if we control for regional macroeconomic developments such 
as the regional insolvency rate or GDP growth. 
13 Alvarez and Glasgow (2000) support this combination of two-stage probit least squares and two-stage 
conditional maximum-likelihood techniques to benefit from the explicit test of exogeneity in the binary equation. 
14 Implementing fitted values from the market-power equation (1a) into the structural equation (2a) instead of the 
combination of residuals and the true Lerner index would mean that we try to estimate a probit model with an 
unknown scaling factor which would not grant valid inference. 
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estimation, using the probability of experiencing a distress event as the dependent variable. In 
both empirical models, we allow for feedback effects between market power and risk, as 
described above. The overall fit of our model is quite good with an adjusted R² of about 0.42 
for the market power equation and a pseudo-R2 of 0.25 for the risk equation. The following 
tables split up the sample by banking group (Table 4a and 4b). Finally, we run several 
robustness tests to account for the potential endogeneity of the internationalization variable 
(Table 5a and 5b). 
4.2.1 Determinants of Market Power (Lerner Index) 
Table 3a provides regression results for market power as the dependent variable. A higher 
volume of foreign activities (i.e. expanding along the intensive margin) has a positive impact 
on market power. In this sense, our results are in line with Hypothesis H1. This effect is 
driven by cross border assets held through domestic headquarters and through foreign 
branches. A higher volume of foreign activities of subsidiaries lowers market power at home. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that subsidiaries are a particularly costly way of 
entering foreign markets and that branching is geared towards retail activities.  
Being active in a larger number of countries (i.e. expanding along the extensive margin) has a 
negative impact on market power at home. This shows that foreign expansions are costly and 
squeeze profit margins. In unreported regressions, we have checked whether threshold effects 
drive this result, i.e. whether increasing international activities beyond a certain number of 
countries (10 for cross-border assets, 5 for countries with foreign affiliates) drives this result. 
This is in fact the case: the negative impact of the extensive margin is driven by banks which 
are present in more than 10 countries. Generally though, the impact of internationalization on 
market power is relatively small compared to the impact of the control variables included as 
most of the estimated coefficients are substantially smaller.  
For the control variables, we mostly obtain significant and expected results. The share of fee 
income measures whether banks can retain their market power by substituting traditional 
interest income with fee income (Allen and Santomero 2001, De Young and Rowland 2001). 
We find a positive relationship between the share of fee income and the Lerner index.  
Larger banks might be able to charge high mark-ups due to their dominant role in output 
markets, but they may also enjoy market power due to economies of scale in funding markets. 
We include a discrete variable to indicate the size quintile of banks’ total assets (from 1 to 
5).15 Results show a negative link between size and market power as, in Germany, smaller 
savings and cooperative banks enjoy substantial market power in regional and niche markets. 
We measure the degree of specialization of banks’ activities using Hirschman-Herfindahl 
indices computed across different asset categories. A higher degree of specialization can have 
                                                 
15 Results are qualitative identical if we use log size instead. 
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at least three distinct effects on the performance of banks. First, specialization in certain 
banking activities may yield benefits in terms of higher margins if banks succeed in 
developing superior skills compared to other intermediaries (Goddard et al. 2007). Second, 
economies of scope can increase the competitiveness of banks (Berger et al. 1987, Ferrier et 
al. 1993). Third, in response to increasing deregulation, some banks have ventured into novel 
business activities, such as off-balance sheet activities (Stiroh 2004) to substitute for eroding 
interest margins (Amel et al. 2004). Lacking specific expertise, such strategies could lower 
returns and increase volatility and thus risk (De Young and Rowland 2001). According to the 
first two effects, the impact of specialization would be positive, but the last effect could have 
a negative impact. Our results support the positive impact of greater specialization – focusing 
on certain activities, increases market power. Regional concentration (the number of branches 
in each region and the number of new acquisitions) enhances market power as well.  
As a final control variable, we include a dummy for publicly incorporated banks, and we find 
a significantly negative impact on market power.  
Splitting the sample by type of bank also brings about interesting differences (Table 4a). For 
cooperative banks, being active abroad has no significant impact on market power. For 
savings banks, a greater volume of foreign assets lowers market power while holding assets in 
a large number of markets increases risk. For commercial banks, we find the positive impact 
of the intensive margin that is also present in the full sample. 
4.2.2 Determinants of Risk (Probability of Distress) 
Table 3b shows the determinants of the probability of distress for German banks. As regards 
the impact of internationalization on bank risk, the key results might seem rather unexpected 
at first sight: holding assets in a larger number of countries increases rather than decreases 
bank risk. This result contradicts the prior that diversification lowers risk. Recall, however, 
that there is an additional counterbalancing effect, namely the monitoring costs associated 
with the management of a large and complex portfolio (Winton 1999). As a result, bank risk 
may well increase in response to an expansion into a larger number of countries. This 
interpretation is supported by the fact that the risk-increasing effect of expansions along the 
extensive margin is driven by the cooperative banks and thus the banking group which, 
arguably, is the least experienced internationally (Table 4b). For the remaining banking 
groups, the extensive margin has an insignificant impact.  
The volume of activities (intensive margin) has an insignificant impact on bank risk. This 
result is, in fact, not unexpected as we have argued that the degree of diversification rather 
than the scale of foreign activities should matter for bank risk (Hypothesis H2). 
In addition to the internationalization variables, we include a standard vector of control 
variables which conditions the likelihood of distress on CAMEL covariates capturing various 
aspects of bank-specific risks (capitalization, asset quality, managerial skill, earnings, and 
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liquidity) (Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007). From a theoretical point of view, we expect more 
profitable, better capitalized, and banks with a less risky asset portfolio to be less likely to 
experience a distress event. The signs for the control variables are in line with these 
expectations and with previous literature (Kick and Koetter 2007). Banks with a lower level 
of hidden reserves and with a lower return on equity are more likely to experience a distress 
event (Berger 1995). In line with e.g. Wheelock and Wilson (1995), higher cost efficiency 
lowers bank risk. Higher profit efficiency, in turn, has only a weakly significant positive 
impact on risk. This result corroborates the well-known negative correlation between cost and 
profit efficiency measures (Bauer et al. 1998), which underpins that both concepts measure 
different types of optimal behavior of bank managers: the realization of optimal profits seems 
to involve inevitably higher risk-taking while economizing on costs does not. The core capital 
ratio, the share of non-performing loans, and the cost-to income ratio have no significant 
impact.  
4.3 Endogeneity of Foreign Assets 
Apart from the endogeneity of risk and return at the bank level, the potential endogeneity of 
the internationalization variables is a concern. Banks engaged in risky domestic activities 
could venture abroad to offset high risk at home. Moreover, one would also expect banks to 
be more active internationally if this rewards them with greater market power at home. 
We address potential endogeneity of foreign assets in three ways: (i) by adopting a proxy for 
the exogenous component of banks’ foreign assets; (ii) by using lagged foreign status; and 
(iii) by focusing on banks which have changed foreign status only.  
Turning to the first measure, we adopt a methodology that has been suggested in the empirical 
literature studying the link between trade openness and growth at the country-level. Frankel 
and Romer (1999) propose to measure the causal impact of trade on growth by employing 
geographic variables as an (exogenous) instrument for foreign trade. Their method is based on 
a two-step estimation model. In a first step, a bilateral openness equation is specified. 
Predicted bilateral openness measures from this equation are then aggregated to obtain a 
measure of aggregate openness which is related to a set of exogenous variables only. In a 
second step, predicted openness is used as an instrument in a regression explaining the impact 
of openness on GDP per capita.  
This method does not fully suit our panel context, since geographic variables used to extract 
the exogenous component of trade are time-invariant. A time-varying exogenous explanatory 
variable is thus required for the first-stage regression. In our setup drawing on bank-level 
data, essentially all foreign macroeconomic variables can be considered exogenous from the 
individual bank’s perspective. Hence, our modified Frankel-Romer regression looks as 
follows: 
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ijtjtijiijt GDPaDistaaFA ε+++=
*
2,1,0        (3) 
where ijtFA is the share of foreign assets across modes relative to total assets of bank i held in 
country j in year t, jDist  is the geographic distance between Germany and country j, 
*
jtGDP is 
foreign GDP which is exogenous to the individual bank i, and ijtε  is an error term which 
captures the bank-specific determinants of foreign assets shares such as risk and market 
power. We estimate equation (3) bank-by-bank using OLS to obtain bank-specific regression 
coefficients. 
The predicted values from this equation are used to obtain a bank-specific instrument which 
draws on geographic components and exogenous country-variables of bilateral openness. Re-
writing (3) in matrix form ijtjtiijtFA ε+= Θ'a  where ia  is the vector of coefficients and jtΘ  
is the vector of right-hand-side variables, bank i’s overall predicted foreign assets are given 
by: ∑=∧
j
jtiijtFA Θ'aˆ . 
For the predicted foreign asset share to be a good instrument for the actual foreign asset share, 
it should be sufficiently highly correlated. This is indeed the case. The correlation between the 
predicted and the actual foreign asset share at the bank-level (i.e. aggregated across all 
countries) is 0.58. To eliminate the country dimension in the data, we aggregate these foreign 
asset shares across all countries.  
Results are reported in Column (2) of Table 5a and Table 5b. They are qualitatively 
unchanged from those using the actual volume of foreign assets: expansions along the 
intensive margin increase market power, these expansions have no impact on risk, market 
power and risk are negatively correlated, and the remaining control variables retain their signs 
and significance.  
The second device to account for the endogeneity of foreign assets is to use foreign status 
lagged by two periods as a right-hand side variable. The underlying reasoning is that current 
market power and risk are unlikely to have affected internationalization decisions taken in the 
past. This method also addresses the fact that up-front costs of international expansions may 
be high and that a positive effect on market power may materialize only over time. Results in 
Column (3) of Table 5 are very similar to those using the actual or the predicted share of 
foreign assets. However, the usefulness of this method is limited by the fact that foreign status 
may be persistent.  
Finally, we use information on changes in foreign status, i.e. we use first differences of the 
extensive margin as a right-hand side variable. Again, we lag this variable by two periods, and 
we distinguish entry and exits. The new indicator equals One if a given bank has left any 
foreign market two years ago and Zero otherwise. Finally, we include a similar variable using 
the number of countries from which the bank has withdrawn. Results in Columns (4) and (5) 
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of Table 5a and 5b show that past exits have a negative impact on market power and no 
impact on risk. 
4.4 Robustness 
To check the robustness of our results, we have divided the sample into weak and severe 
distress events, we have used the z-score described in Section 3.2 as an alternative risk 
measure, and we have dropped explanatory variables one by one. Results are not reported but 
are available upon request. 
Splitting the sample into weak and severe distress events provides qualitatively identical 
results compared to those reported above: the mutual negative impact of market power on 
return (vice versa) survives the robustness check. As to internationalization, expansions along 
the extensive margin lower market power while expansions along the intensive margins 
increase market power. Effects on risk are insignificant.  
Using the z-score as an alternative risk measure basically confirms the negative correlation 
between risk and market power, but the impact of predicted Lerner indices on the z-score are 
sometimes insignificant. The impact of internationalization on market power is mostly 
replicated in that the extensive margin exercises a negative impact, whereas banks benefit 
from more market power if they expand along the intensive margin. As before, 
internationalization has no significant impact on risk. Results for the remaining explanatory 
variables do not change.  
We also exclude individual explanatory variables one by one to check whether some of our 
results might be driven by multicollinearity. This is not the case. 
Finally, splitting the sample by size reveals differences between small and large banks. For all 
but the mid-sized banks, a higher volume of cross-border assets has a positive effect. The 
impact of expansions along the extensive margin on market power at home varies across 
banks of different size. For the smallest 40% of the banks, it is negative but insignificant. For 
the mid-sized and large banks, it is positive. The negative and significant impact for the full 
sample is driven by the “upper-middle” sized banks in the fourth size quintile. One 
interpretation of this non-linear effect might be that these banks are too large to gain a 
competitive edge from foreign expansions as the mid-sized banks do, but that they are too 
small to reap the true scale economies as the very large banks do. 
5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze whether and through which channels the 
internationalization of banks affects their risk-market power trade-off. We use a very detailed 
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dataset on German banks, which provides information on actual distress events (our measure 
of banks’ risk), banks’ market power (our bank-level measure of competition), and 
comprehensive data about banks’ international activities. We can distinguish between 
different modes of entry into foreign markets such as cross-border assets, foreign branches, 
and foreign subsidiaries. Hence, we depart from previous literature by analyzing the risk-
market power nexus for banks from an international angle. Methodologically, our results 
differ because we simultaneously model risk and market power. 
Our analysis has four main findings: 
First, there is a negative correlation between market power and the probability to experience a 
distress event for German banks. This negative relationship between risk and return is in line 
with the theoretical model by Allen and Gale (2004) or the margin effect stressed by 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2008). According to this explanation, more profitable banks can 
build up buffers against loan losses.  
Second, banks with higher shares of cross-border assets either held directly by their domestic 
headquarters or by foreign branches have higher market power at home. We also find that 
large banks in Germany not necessarily enjoy also greater market power. Instead, after 
controlling for other bank-specific characteristics, market power and size are negatively 
correlated. 
Third, banks with a foreign presence in a large number of foreign countries are more likely to 
reveal above-average probabilities of distress, possibly because of the costs of maintaining a 
large international banking network. 
Fourth, banks of different size and from different banking groups benefit differently from 
internationalization. Commercial and savings banks tend to improve their risk-return trade-
off; cooperative banks tend to worsen their risk-return trade-off. Also, bank size has an 
impact. Hence, the substantial heterogeneity across banks at the national level is also reflected 
in a heterogeneous impact of bank globalization. 
More research is certainly required to check the robustness of our results using data for other 
countries and time periods. One shortcoming of our analysis is certainly that our data do not 
include full information about off-balance sheet activities of banks. Overall though, our 
results suggest that both the benefits of internationalization in terms of increasing margins and 
reduced risk are rather small. Even for the banks that can increases their market power 
through internationalization, the marginal effects of going abroad are relatively small 
compared to the domestic determinants of market power. At the same time, and perhaps 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, internationalization has only a limited impact on bank 
distress. Instead, the most important determinants of bank risk are their market power and 
profitability as well as their hidden reserves. 
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7 Data Appendix 
All bank data are obtained from unconsolidated balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and 
audit reports reported annually by all banks to the German central bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank). Variables used for both the productivity estimation and the CAMEL vector are 
corrected for outliers by truncating at the 1st and 99th percentiles, respectively. Level variables 
are deflated with the consumer price index.  
 
Bank-level variables 
Acquisitions: The number of acquisitions per regional agglomeration area. 
Assets: Gross total assets. An indicator variable based on the size distribution of total assets 
per year ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
Banking groups: An indicator variable ranging from 1 to 4 for large banks, regional 
commercial, regional savings, and cooperative banks. “Large” banks comprise the head 
institutions of the savings (Landesbanken) and cooperative bank sector as well as the largest 
commercial banks. “Commercial banks” are privately owned, but not necessarily publicly 
listed banks. “Savings” banks are (local) government owned regional banks. “Cooperative” 
banks are mutually owned regional banks. 
Branches: The number of branches per bank relative to total assets. 
Capitalization: Core capital in per cent of gross total assets. 
Cost efficiency: Cost efficiency obtained from a latent stochastic cost frontier analysis with 
two technology regimes. 
Cost-income ratio: Personnel expenditure in per cent of total administrative cost. 
Customer loans: Loans to corporate customers and individuals. 
Equity: Gross total equity in millions of euro. 
Herfindahl index (output categories): Diversification indicator across four output categories of 
banks, interbank loans, customer loans, bonds and stocks, and notional values of granted 
guarantees and credit commitments, calculated as the sum of squared shares of each product 
category. 
Interbank loans: Loans to banks and other depository institutions. 
Loan-loss-provisions: Stock of loan-loss provisions in per cent of gross total loans. 
Non-performing loans: Loans with latent risks according to central bank auditors in per cent 
of total audited loans. 
Off-balance sheet items: Granted credit guarantees and commitments. 
Physical capital: Fixed assets including IT-capital stock in millions of euro. 
Profit efficiency: Profit efficiency obtained from a latent stochastic profit frontier analysis 
with two technology regimes. 
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Publicly incorporated banks: Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank is publicly incorporated, 
either as joint stock or public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft (AG); 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KG a.A.); Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung 
(GmbH)). 
Reserves: Hidden reserves according to §340f of the German commercial code in per cent of 
gross total assets. 
Return on equity (ROE): Operating result including net interest, fee, commission and trading 
income in per cent of equity capital. 
Securities: Bonds and stocks. 
Share of fee income: Provision and fee income relative to total operating gross revenues. 
 
External Position Report  
Data on the international assets of German banks are taken from the External Position report 
(Auslandsstatus) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. They are confidential and can be used on the 
premises of the Bundesbank only. 
International assets: Loans and advances to banks, companies, governments, bonds and notes, 
foreign shares and other equity, participation abroad, denominated or converted into Euro. 
Irrevocable credit commitments are included but other off-balance sheet items are not. For a 
more detailed description of this data base see (Fiorentino et al. 2010). 
Branches and subsidiaries: Foreign affiliates of German parent banks. Branches do not have 
an independent legal status, whereas subsidiaries do. We attribute assets held by affiliates to 
the country in which they are located. 
List of countries:  
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bosnia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Cayman Islands 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Egypt 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxemburg 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Netherlands 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Vietnam  
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Data on Bank Risk 
To measure the soundness of the German banking sector, we use confidential information 
from the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank for individual banks at an annual 
frequency. These data allow for a distinction between different distress categories that differ 
in terms of severity of distress observed:  
o Mandatory announcements by individual banks to the supervisory authority (Distress 
Category I), 
o Official warnings by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) 
(Distress Category II), 
o Direct interventions into the ongoing business of a bank by the BaFin (Distress 
Category III), and 
o All events that reflect the disappearance of a bank from active business operations 
such as closure of a bank or restructuring mergers (Distress Category IV).  
23
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Internationalization 
This Table gives the descriptive statistics for the measures of portfolio diversification and the market power in 
foreign markets described in Section 3.2. The number of observations (n) gives the number of bank-year 
observations.  
 
Full sample 
used in 
regressions  
(n = 6,752) 
Banks with 
foreign 
subsidiaries  
(n = 129) 
Banks with 
foreign 
branches  
(n = 137) 
    
Extensive margin    
Number of destination countries 13.670 46.920 42.550 
Number of foreign branches of bank i 0.921 4.240 4.540 
Number of foreign subsidiaries of bank i 0.726 3.798 3.124 
Intensive margin    
Foreign assets (cross-border) / total assets 4.171 22.828 23.630 
Foreign assets (branches) / total assets 0.250 10.416 12.311 
Foreign assets (subsidiaries) / total assets 0.135 7.088 4.633 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
This Table gives the descriptive statistics for explanatory variables used in the regressions for risk (probability of 
distress) and market power (Lerner index). All ratios and changes are measured in percent. Moments are based 
on lagged values used in regressions. 7,752 observations. 
  Mean Standard deviation 1st percentile 
99th percen-
tile 
 
Internationalization     
Total foreign assets / total assets 4.75 8.51 0.01 46.48 
Extensive margin 13.74 9.48 2.00 54.00 
 
Market power (Lerner index)     
Acquisitions  1.92 2.47 0.00 12.00 
Branches  29.21 21.28 0.20 100.45 
Cost efficiency 84.43 9.84 56.25 98.34 
Herfindahl index (output categories) 46.29 8.85 29.42 71.10 
Lerner index 0.23 0.11 -0.07 0.05 
Profit efficiency 73.43 12.79 27.50 92.29 
Public incorporated  (0/1) 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Share of fee income 12.21 5.05 2.29 28.93 
Size quintile 3.08 1.39 1.00 5.00 
 
Risk (Probability of distress)     
Capitalization 5.64 2.13 2.60 10.86 
Customer loans 58.99 12.70 22.73 83.75 
Non-performing loans 8.68 7.13 0.31 32.91 
Probability of distress 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Reserves 1.54 1.04 0.00 4.60 
Return on equity 0.12 0.09 -0.15 0.34 
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Table 3: Baseline Regression Results  
This Table gives regression results for simultaneously estimating the probability of distress and the market 
power of banks (Lerner index) as described in Section 4.1. Estimations of the Lerner index in Table (a) use OLS, 
estimations of the probability of distress in Table (b) use a probit model. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one period. Dummies for different banking groups, time, and regional fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Extensive margin = number of countries in which bank is present, intensive margin = foreign assets / total assets. 
Table (a) depicts standardized coefficients in brackets, Table (b) reports marginal effects. ***, **, * = significant 
at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level drawing on bootstrapped standard errors.  
(a) Market Power (Lerner Index)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Predicted risk -0.0546*** -0.0545*** -0.0546*** -0.0547*** -0.0551*** 
 (-0.420) (-0.420) (-0.422) (-0.427) (-0.426) 
Share of fee income 0.00213*** 0.00226*** 0.00227*** 0.00225*** 0.00220*** 
 (0.0951) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100) (0.0982) 
Size quintile -0.00525*** -0.00223 -0.00213 -0.00321** -0.00274** 
 (-0.0648) (-0.0275) (-0.0263) (-0.0396) (-0.0338) 
Herfindahl index (output categories) 0.00139*** 0.00144*** 0.00149*** 0.00127*** 0.00134*** 
 (0.109) (0.113) (0.117) (0.0993) (0.105) 
Publicly incorporated (0/1) -0.0258* -0.0254** -0.0252* -0.0177 -0.0264** 
 (-0.0427) (-0.0420) (-0.0417) (-0.0293) (-0.0436) 
Branches 0.000268*** 0.000259** 0.000260*** 0.000275*** 0.000265*** 
 (0.0505) (0.0489) (0.0491) (0.0520) (0.0501) 
Acquisitions 0.00164*** 0.00152*** 0.00144*** 0.00185*** 0.00167*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0334) (0.0316) (0.0407) (0.0367) 
Extensive margin  -0.000771*** -0.000751*** -0.000423** -0.000592***
  (-0.0644) (-0.0628) (-0.0353) (-0.0494) 
Foreign assets / total assets  0.000787***    
  (0.0592)    
Foreign assets (cross-border) / total assets   0.00104***   
   (0.0587)   
Foreign assets (subsidiaries) / total assets    -0.00929***  
    (-0.108)  
Foreign assets (branches) / total assets     0.00244*** 
     (0.0586) 
Observations 6,752 6,752 6,752 6,752 6,752 
Adjusted R²  0.415 0.419 0.419 0.418 0.423 
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(b) Risk (Probability of Distress)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lerner    -0.165*** -0.123** -0.122*** -0.113** -0.122** 
 (0.0459) (0.0560) (0.0404) (0.0560) (0.0476) 
Lerner residuals 0.138*** 0.0963* 0.0952** 0.0879* 0.0961** 
 (0.0426) (0.0529) (0.0419) (0.0485) (0.0452) 
Core capital ratio 0.00143 0.00105 0.000907 0.000853 0.000989 
 (0.00110) (0.00149) (0.000836) (0.00104) (0.00132) 
Reserves -0.00568*** -0.00658*** -0.00655*** -0.00652* -0.00650*** 
 (0.00150) (0.00158) (0.00176) (0.00356) (0.00118) 
Customer loan share 0.000104 0.000101 0.000116 6.36e-05 9.03e-05 
 (9.47e-05) (8.54e-05) (7.73e-05) (5.34e-05) (5.92e-05) 
Non-performing loans -9.51e-05 -6.78e-05 -7.29e-05 -5.95e-05 -6.76e-05 
 (0.000108) (8.49e-05) (0.000104) (0.000132) (0.000102) 
Cost-income ratio 0.000122 0.000112 0.000119 0.000111 0.000111 
 (0.000134) (0.000158) (0.000138) (0.000149) (0.000133) 
Return on equity -0.0337*** -0.0365*** -0.0365*** -0.0368* -0.0366*** 
 (0.00947) (0.0119) (0.0110) (0.0190) (0.0105) 
Cost efficiency -0.000203*** -0.000229*** -0.000224** -0.000211** -0.000229***
 (7.38e-05) (8.24e-05) (9.85e-05) (9.85e-05) (6.84e-05) 
Profit efficiency 0.000151* 0.000103 0.000104 8.57e-05 0.000103 
 (7.75e-05) (9.44e-05) (6.52e-05) (7.85e-05) (0.000108) 
Extensive margin  0.000178 0.000167 0.000228 0.000188 
  (0.000113) (0.000161) (0.000163) (0.000122) 
Foreign assets / total assets  3.84e-05    
  (0.000152)    
Foreign assets (cross-border) / total assets   0.000143   
   (0.000194)   
Foreign assets (subsidiaries) / total assets    -0.00266  
    (0.0202)  
Foreign assets (branches) / total assets     8.52e-05 
     (0.000290) 
Observations 6,752 6,752 6,752 6,752 6,752 
Pseudo R²  0.245 0.247 0.248 0.252 0.248 
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Table 4: Regression Results by Banking Group  
This Table gives regression results for simultaneously estimating the probability of distress and the market 
power of banks (Lerner index) as described in Section 4.1. Estimations of the Lerner index in Table (a) use OLS, 
estimations of the probability of distress in Table (b) use a probit model. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one period. Dummies for different banking groups, time, and regional fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Extensive margin = number of countries in which bank is present, intensive margin = foreign assets / total assets. 
Table (a) depicts standardized coefficients in brackets, Table (b) reports marginal effects. ***, **, * = significant 
at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level drawing on bootstrapped standard errors. 
(a) Market Power (Lerner Index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Commercial banks Savings banks Cooperative banks
Predicted risk -0.0545*** -0.00364** -0.0156*** -0.0756*** 
 (-0.420) (-0.219) (-0.538) (-0.604) 
Share of fee income 0.00226*** 0.00127 0.00372*** 0.00330*** 
 (0.101) (0.109) (0.111) (0.121) 
Size quintile -0.00223 -0.0670*** -0.0135*** 0.00572*** 
 (-0.0275) (-0.481) (-0.142) (0.0647) 
Herfindahl index (output categories) 0.00144*** 0.00259*** 0.00219*** 0.000553*** 
 (0.113) (0.257) (0.239) (0.0430) 
Publicly incorporated (0/1) -0.0254** -0.0308  0.0181* 
 (-0.0420) (-0.0805)  (0.0135) 
Branches 0.000259*** -0.00153 0.00106*** 0.000463*** 
 (0.0489) (-0.0903) (0.120) (0.0987) 
Acquisitions 0.00152*** -0.000658 -0.00293*** 0.00356*** 
 (0.0334) (-0.0161) (-0.0777) (0.0769) 
Foreign assets / total assets 0.000787*** 0.00150*** -0.00242*** -0.000419 
 (0.0592) (0.235) (-0.0982) (-0.0140) 
Extensive margin -0.000771*** 0.000628 0.000530* -0.000396 
 (-0.0644) (0.0526) (0.0632) (-0.0234) 
Observations 6,752 218 1,173 4,710 
Adjusted R²  0.419 0.246 0.448 0.390 
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(b) Risk (Probability of Distress)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Commercial banks Savings banks Cooperative banks
Lerner -0.123** 4.24e-05 7.97e-05 -0.217*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0256) (0.0217) (0.0650) 
Lerner residuals 0.0963* -0.000128 -0.000109 0.180*** 
 (0.0566) (0.0828) (0.0289) (0.0656) 
Core capital ratio 0.00105 -6.86e-07 -1.45e-05 0.00308 
 (0.00134) (0.000620) (0.00448) (0.00220) 
Reserves -0.00658*** -1.70e-05 -2.32e-05 -0.00657*** 
 (0.00142) (0.0148) (0.00771) (0.00224) 
Customer loan share 0.000101 6.00e-08 -1.23e-08 8.08e-05 
 (8.39e-05) (4.23e-05) (5.80e-06) (0.000151) 
Non-performing loans -6.78e-05 5.84e-07 1.32e-06 -0.000333** 
 (9.12e-05) (0.000525) (0.000453) (0.000149) 
Cost-income ratio 0.000112 4.35e-07 2.72e-07 0.000122 
 (0.000117) (0.000478) (0.000116) (0.000167) 
Return on equity -0.0365*** -0.000450 -6.53e-05 -0.0375*** 
 (0.0112) (0.338) (0.0225) (0.0143) 
Cost efficiency -0.000229*** -2.29e-09 -1.61e-06 -2.40e-05 
 (6.79e-05) (5.46e-05) (0.000547) (0.000132) 
Profit efficiency 0.000103 -1.02e-06 -8.14e-07 0.000363** 
 (7.97e-05) (0.000753) (0.000257) (0.000147) 
Foreign assets / total assets 3.84e-05 4.72e-07 -3.58e-06 -0.000226 
 (0.000174) (0.000406) (0.00127) (0.000320) 
Extensive margin 0.000178** 1.57e-06 9.31e-07 0.000388*** 
 (8.71e-05) (0.00109) (0.000313) (0.000138) 
Observations 6,752 218 1,181 4,710 
Pseudo R²  0.247 0.318 0.528 0.249 
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Table 5: Endogeneity of Foreign Status 
This Table gives regression results for simultaneously estimating the probability of distress and the market 
power of banks (Lerner index) as described in Section 4.1. Estimations of the Lerner index in Table (a) use OLS, 
estimations of the probability of distress in Table (b) use a probit model. All explanatory variables are lagged by 
one period. Dummies for different banking groups, time, and regional fixed effects are included but not reported. 
Entry (0/1) is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bank has increased the number of foreign countries in 
which it is active, Exit (0/1) is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bank has lowered the number of 
countries. Exit (number) and Entry (number) are the corresponding variables using the absolute value of the 
count of countries from which a bank has withdrawn or into which a bank has newly expanded. Extensive 
margin = number of countries in which bank is present, intensive margin = foreign assets / total assets. Table (a) 
depicts standardized coefficients in brackets, Table (b) reports marginal effects. ***, **, * = significant at the 
1%, 5%, 10%-level drawing on bootstrapped standard errors. 
(a) Market Power (Lerner Index) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Predicted risk -0.0545*** -0.0545*** -0.0569*** -0.0603*** -0.0595*** 
 (-0.420) (-0.420) (-0.454) (-0.497) (-0.494) 
Share of fee income 0.00226*** 0.00216*** 0.00213*** 0.00165*** 0.00163*** 
 (0.101) (0.0964) (0.0980) (0.0813) (0.0799) 
Size quintile -0.00223 -0.00561*** -0.00470*** -0.00167 -0.00222 
 (-0.0275) (-0.0693) (-0.0594) (-0.0218) (-0.0289) 
Herfindahl index (output categories) 0.00144*** 0.00147*** 0.00122*** 0.00108*** 0.00108*** 
 (0.113) (0.116) (0.0977) (0.0872) (0.0869) 
Branches 0.000259*** 0.000266*** 0.000262** 0.000335*** 0.000324***
 (0.0489) (0.0503) (0.0481) (0.0618) (0.0596) 
Acquisitions 0.00152*** 0.00132** -0.000519 -0.00281*** -0.00304*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0291) (-0.0114) (-0.0468) (-0.0507) 
Publicly incorporated (0/1) -0.0254** -0.0277* -0.0194 0.00345 0.00314 
 (-0.0420) (-0.0457) (-0.0325) (0.00604) (0.00549) 
Foreign assets / total assets 0.000787***     
 (0.0592)     
Extensive margin -0.000771***     
 (-0.0644)     
Intensive margin (Frankel Romer)  0.000786***    
  (0.0586)    
Total foreign assets / total assets (t-2)   0.000491   
   (0.0358)   
Entry (0/1) (t-2)    0.000944  
    (0.00439)  
Exit (0/1) (t-2)    -0.0192***  
    (-0.0867)  
Entry (number) (t-2)     0.000967 
     (0.0182) 
Exit (number) (t-2)     -0.00465*** 
     (-0.0663) 
Observations 6,752 6,752 4,938 2,881 2,881 
Adjusted R²  0.419 0.417 0.370 0.425 0.424 
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(b) Risk (Probability of Distress)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lerner -0.123*** -0.164*** -0.161*** -0.193*** -0.184 
 (0.0462) (0.0412) (0.0614) (0.0664) (0.147) 
Lerner residuals 0.0963** 0.137*** 0.137** 0.171*** 0.164 
 (0.0446) (0.0374) (0.0548) (0.0643) (0.139) 
Core capital ratio 0.00105 0.00137 0.00264 0.00413** 0.00387 
 (0.00111) (0.000847) (0.00171) (0.00189) (0.00370) 
Reserves -0.00658*** -0.00565*** -0.00297** -0.00210 -0.00227 
 (0.00203) (0.00164) (0.00143) (0.00225) (0.00221) 
Customer loan share 0.000101 0.000125** 8.34e-05 2.78e-05 3.22e-05 
 (7.36e-05) (5.47e-05) (0.000102) (0.000127) (0.000102) 
Non-performing loans -6.78e-05 -0.000107 -0.000153 -7.10e-05 -7.14e-05 
 (9.09e-05) (0.000105) (0.000110) (0.000105) (5.97e-05) 
Cost-income ratio 0.000112 0.000144 8.17e-05 0.000174 0.000169** 
 (0.000142) (0.000124) (9.76e-05) (0.000255) (8.23e-05) 
Return on equity -0.0365*** -0.0340*** -0.0228** -0.0191 -0.0194 
 (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.00946) (0.0166) (0.0142) 
Cost efficiency -0.000229*** -0.000200*** -0.000146** -5.61e-05 -6.74e-05 
 (8.23e-05) (6.06e-05) (7.01e-05) (0.000113) (0.000125) 
Profit efficiency 0.000103 0.000158** 0.000196* 0.000261** 0.000252 
 (8.21e-05) (7.10e-05) (0.000105) (0.000119) (0.000213) 
Foreign assets / total assets 3.84e-05     
 (0.000164)     
Extensive margin 0.000178*     
 (9.88e-05)     
Intensive margin (Frankel Romer)  0.000142    
  (0.000112)    
Total foreign assets / total assets (t-2)   -7.90e-06   
   (0.000207)   
Entry (0/1) (t-2)    0.000448  
    (0.00185)  
Exit (0/1) (t-2)    -0.00326**  
    (0.00154)  
Entry (number) (t-2)     0.000264 
     (0.000462) 
Exit (number) (t-2)     -0.000821 
     (0.000681) 
Observations 6,752 6,752 4,938 2,881 2,881 
Pseudo R²  0.247 0.245 0.262 0.275 0.276 
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